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have repeated, it seems almost without thinking, that unfortunate dicta
of Lord Eldon. Certainly the whole question of reputation is peculiar
in this, that society offers no adequate compensation for its loss. Unlike
converted personal property, something similar or equivalent to it can-
not be purchased with money, nor can it be restored like other matters
of substance by the person who has wrongfully taken it. Reputation
is necessary for a man to live as befits his nature; injury to it results
often in irreparable damage to the individual's personal, economic,
and social life. For that reason society owes an urgent duty to preserve
it for the individual. Adequate protection can only be given by pre-
venting the cause of damage; money damages are altogether inade-
quate, just as they are in the case of unique chattels. Today, will some
court say that a good name, and honor in the community, merit equit-
able protection ?27
RADIO BROADCASTING--LIBEL AND SLANDER-JOINT TORT FEASORS
-There is always a certain amount of time elapsing between the enact-
ment of a new law and its interpretation by the court, and the case of
the Radio Act of 19271 is no exception to the rule. Five years after the
passage of this law we find the first interpretation of one of its sec-
tion,2 by the supreme court of the state of Nebraska. The court was
provided with an opportunity in Sorenson v. Wood 3 to extend, by anal-
ogy, the law of slander and libel to a virgin soil, that of the field of
radio broadcasting. A brief review of the above case shows a radio
station being joined as a joint tort feasor with a political speaker who
libels in respect to the right of publication; the constitutional guarantee
should apply to both. A libelous attack on a man's business will
be prevented; but what is more fundamental, a libelous attack on the
man's own good name, will not, it seems, be prevented. Ex parte Tucker,
110 Tex. 335, 220 S.W. 75 (1920) directly denied equity jurisdiction as being
unconstitutional; but Hawks v. Yancey, 265 S.W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 233 (1924)
granted an injunction for slander, distinguishing its decision from the preced-
ing case on the grounds of intimidation, (no property right, other than that
of good name, was involved in the case). Northern Wis. Co-operative Tobacco
Pool v. Bekkedal, 182 Wis. 571 197 N.W. 936 (1924) restrained oral solicita-
tions injuring business. John F. Jelke Co. v. Hill, 242 N.W. (Wis.) 576 (1932)
evaded a direct decision on the question upon technical grounds, but asserted
that there may be limitations on the right to speak, citing in particular State
ex rel. Olson v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 219 N.W. 770, 58 A.L.R. 607 (1928)
and Near v. Minn, ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931).
27 See Chafee, Freedom of the Press, for further discussion of the constitutional
aspect of the question.
'Feb. 23, 1927 C. 169 § 18, 44 Stat. 1170.
2 47 United States Court of Appeals § 98, 44 Stat. 1170.
3243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932).
NOTES
had uttered defamatory statements concerning the plaintiff in the
action. By means of this defendant's equipment. Defendant set up as
a defense order No. 314 of the federal radio commission as well as the
requirements of the statute noted above.5
The court in the formulation of its opinion set forth the view that
this act of congress does not contain an authorization or sanction to
libel. It states that in so doing, it would conflict with the fifth amend-
ment of the constitution, which prohibits the taking of property with-
out due process of law. The act confers no privilege upon the broad-
casting station, and in the court's interpretation, it refers merely to a
censorship of political views. The court was forced to decide as to
whether the utterances into the ether were slander or libel, since liabil-
ity imposed for each has its own limitations. Libel, of course, is the
more serious offense since "written defamation may be circulated more
widely and can therefore do more harm; it is more permanent in form;
and that it requires deliberation and is therefore more injurious."6
According to Mills v. Wamser,7 the writing of the speech before broad-
cast constitutes sufficient publication to make the speaker liable.
Whether an analogy should be drawn between a newspaper and a
radio broadcast, or between a common carrier such as the telephone
or telegraph and a radio broadcast presented a perplexing question.
Arguments for the former were the weightier in the mind of the court.
In telephone service, the communications are between the parties to the
conversation, over whom the company has no control. In a radio broad-
cast, there is a joint participation8 of the station and the speaker, for
without both, there could be no sounds broadcast. Moreover, the speak-
er speaks to an invisible audience, thousands in number. The telegraph
companies are granted a limited liability due to their state as common
carriersY a radio company can deal with its advertisers as it sees fit;
4 Order No. 31, Federal Radio Commission "such licensee shall have no power
of censorship over material broadcast under the provisions of" 47 United
States Court of Appeals § 98.
5 47 United States Court of Appeals § 98. Use of broadcasting station by legally
qualified candidates; censorship. "If any licensee shall permit any person who
is a legally qualified candidate for any public office to use a broadcasting sta-
tion, he shall afford equal opportunities to all other candidates for that office
in the use of such broadcasting station, and the licensing authority shall make
rules and regulations to carry this provision into effect. Provided that such
licensee shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under
the provisions of this section."
6 3 Air Law Journal 64-67 Jan. 1932. Charles L. Melton.
Unreported, Superior Court of Washington for the City of Spokane.
8 2 Journal of Radio Law 673-707 Oct. 1932. Lawre'nce Vold.
9 104 Fed. 628, 1900 Nye v. Western Union Telegraph Company.
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and since such power is given to it, it is essential that it exercise a
certain amount of control. Thus, a radio cannot qualify as a common
carrier.' 0
A radio broadcast offers to the speaker a wider circulation than can
a newspaper; and though it is less permanent, it remains a great force
in swaying the public mind. The deliberation involved in placing in
written form a defamatory speech is fully as great as that in giving
the same to a newspaper for publication." Radio, though in its infancy,
is already waging a winning battle for the favor of the large adver-
tisers, and is in direct competition with the newspapers in this field,
as well as in the dissemination of news. Neither should receive special
favors not accorded the other.
An honest mistake, in spite of the use of due care, finds the news-
paper liable in the courts of law.1 2 The means of control within the
powers of a newspaper, are found in similar form in the operation of
a radio station. In the first place, station operators can demand a copy
of the speech to be broadcast, and, in addition, exact promises from
the speaker to refrain from going beyond its contents. Then, during
the course of the broadcast, which are as a rule "monitored," 3 the
operator at the controls may, by the movement of a switch, cut off the
speaker at the slightest deviation from the continuity of the speech, to
insure the station from defamation, in the heat of argument. But what
of the words which may inadvertently pass into the ether? This would
seem to be a risk that the radio stations will have to bear because of the
nature of the business in which they are engaged.'4
Though the courts refuse to impose previous restraints upon the
publication of libels, 5 there is nothing which can prevent a newspaper
from refusing to publish that which they see to be libelous. Having
established the strong analogy between radio broadcasting and news-
paper publishing, the conclusion which may be drawn is that a radio
company may likewise exercise this degree of censorship to free itself
from liability which necessarily must follow, and as did follow in this
case.'
6
RICHARD McDER-MOTT
10 2 Journal of Radio Law 673-707 Oct. 1932.
113 Air Law Journal 64-67 Jan. 1932.
12214 U. S. 185, 1909, Peck v. Tribune Company.
S"Monitored,,"-A radio station by means of its auxiliary equipment may hear
the broadcast as it goes out into the ether, and within reach are the switches
which control the transmitter. This operation of listening to and controlling
the broadcast is called monitoring.
14 214 U. S. 185, Peck v. Tribune Company. "If the publication was libelous, the
defendant took the risk."
"Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1930).
16 Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (Neb. 1932).
